# Your Website Has a Menu Now: 16 Page-Scoped Tools for AI Agents, Live on WebMCP

> Published: 2026-11-19 | Author: AgentBadge Team | Canonical: https://agentbadge.xyz/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools

## Why does a website need tools for agents at all?

*Agents don't need another API key - they need a menu on the page.*

For a junior: today an AI agent that wants to use your website has two bad options - scrape the HTML and guess, or go read your REST API documentation and wire a client. WebMCP is a third option: the page itself registers JavaScript functions - name, description, JSON schema - into document.modelContext, and any WebMCP-aware agent can list them and call them with structured arguments. No key, no SDK, no parsing.

Three things converged in November 2026 that made us ship this now:

- **OpenAI documented Site tools** - their implementation of the WebMCP proposal. The built-in browser in the ChatGPT desktop app discovers site tools and uses them while you watch the same page. (learn.chatgpt.com/docs/webmcp)

- **Chrome runs an Origin Trial** - document.modelContext lives behind --enable-features=WebMCP on Chrome 146+; we tested on Chrome 153.

- **The W3C community spec** (webmachinelearning.github.io/webmcp) defines the contract: registerTool, getTools, executeTool.

And the honest positioning, straight from OpenAI's own doc: WebMCP is for when the human and the agent look at the *same page*; backend MCP is for integrations that run without one. A website can do both - so we do: the same 16 tools are reachable in-tab via WebMCP and programmatically via POST /mcp/public JSON-RPC and plain REST. REST stays the source of truth; both facades are thin adapters.

## What can an agent actually do on the site?

![Stack diagram: browser agents (ChatGPT site tools, Chrome OT) and headless clients on top; a page-scoped TOOLS layer showing different shelves per page plus a shared registry; REST as source of truth with read tools, intake-write and an ops lane; a STORE layer with agentRequest and agentQAPair tables](/images/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools-d1.webp)

*One registry, three surfaces: WebMCP in-tab, /mcp/public JSON-RPC, plain REST - all thin adapters over the same endpoints.*

16 tools today - but **not 16 everywhere**. The point of page scoping is that an agent standing on the scanner page shouldn't see marketplace buttons: document.modelContext.getTools() returns the shelf for *that page*, from PAGE_TOOLSETS in the shared registry:

![getTools() returns 16 tool names on root; scoped pages show subsets; .well-known/webmcp.json lists the same 16](/images/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools-shot-tools.webp)

*Real output: 16 on /, a focused shelf on each scoped page.*

- **Discovery & trust**: agent-readiness-scan, get-compliance-score, search-rules, verify-verdict, check-address-risk, passport-verify, badge-generate

- **Marketplace**: list-services, browse-tasks, get-task, get-task-status

- **Interaction**: submit-request, poll-request, search-agent-qa, list-surveys, how-to-register

Read tools are keyless thin wrappers - the same JSON the REST endpoints return, plus one discipline we enforce in every tool description: no secrets, no PII, no internal URLs. agb_ credentials never appear in a tool result. Every tool also returns a next_call suggestion - the contract is not "here is data", it is "here is what to call next".

We did not start from zero. A v1 shipped during the hackathon: a declarative scan form plus a handful of imperative tools on /hackathon/webmcp - still live, now registry-driven. V2 is what the v1 taught us: one shared registry instead of scattered registrations, page-scoped shelves instead of everything-everywhere, and a real write path instead of read-only demos.

## How does an agent ask a question - and get an answer?

![Funnel diagram: discover via webmcp.json/llms.txt/agent-card/mcp-public; read tools; submit-request the only write; poll-request honest waiting through the ops lane; completed with response; consented qa_ pair enters the corpus; search-agent-qa fast-path for the next agent; side lanes for 429, 7-day expiry and retract](/images/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools-d2.webp)

*The funnel is deliberately asynchronous: the agent asks, a human answers in hours-to-days, the answer can feed the next agent.*

There is exactly one write action: submit-request. It posts a question into our ops inbox (the agent request inbox from our previous article - this is its browser-native front). What comes back is deliberately boring:

![submit-request returns request_id rq_3a672b…, state submitted, poll_url and next_call poll-request; a repeat call returns duplicate:true](/images/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools-shot-submit.webp)

*A request_id, not an answer. Async is a feature, not a broken chatbot.*

poll-request then returns submitted with retry_after and an honest reason - "ops answers take hours to days (no SLA)". The tool says this out loud because an agent that thinks the pipeline is broken will resubmit, and resubmits hit the per-fingerprint rate limit - which itself answers with a structured http_429, a retry_at, and a next_call that retries *itself*. Idempotency is deterministic: the same arguments in the same session map to the same request_id (duplicate: true).

Then, on the other side of the wall, an ops human answers. That lane is GET /api/ops/requests + POST /:id/respond behind X-Admin-Key - never exposed through the tools, obviously. And the next poll just works:

![poll-request returns state completed with response.answer text and next_call search-agent-qa](/images/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools-shot-poll.webp)

*Verbatim prod: completed, the answer inline, and a suggestion where to look next.*

## Where do good answers go? A corpus with a consent gate

![A glass mailbox labelled submit-request feeding a clerk desk; a consent checkbox is stamped YES before the letter can pass to a PUBLIC QA shelf; a retract lever pulls one letter back out; letters without consent go into a PRIVATE tray](/images/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools-corpus.webp)

*Private by default, public by consent, reversible always.*

Every answered request *can* become public knowledge - but only if the asker opted in. publish_to_qa defaults to **false**: your question and our answer stay yours. When consent is on and the answer exists and the request isn't flagged spam, completing the request materializes a qa_* pair into the public corpus - the thing search-agent-qa reads and the fast-path that answers repeated questions instantly, uses counter ticking up per hit. Ops can retract a pair at any time and it drops out of search and matching, idempotently.

![GET /api/requests/qa?q=agent returns real qa_ pairs with question, response.answer, uses, published_at, provenance](/images/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools-shot-qa.webp)

*The corpus as it stands - and an honest empty state when nothing consented exists yet.*

This is the part we think most agent-facing sites will get wrong, twice: first by publishing everything (a privacy breach with a search box), then by showing an empty corpus as a bug. Ours says what it is: *"No public QA answers yet - the corpus only grows from consented, ops-answered requests."*

## What did production verification actually break?

![An inspector robot at a door labelled pg/json; a plain text string slips through the door and explodes a JSON.parse machine behind it; a second panel shows a browser cache box stamped 'max-age=60' being replaced by 'no-store'; green chips read FIXED and re-verified](/images/blog/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools-bugs.webp)

*Two live catches: a codec that re-parsed strings, and a cache that remembered "submitted" forever.*

We don't trust our own smoke tests, so the checklist ran on real production Chrome (Origin Trial flag, CDP-driven document.modelContext) and an external agent. It found two shipped bugs - both now fixed with regression tests:

**Bug 1 - the stale "submitted".** Our shared cache middleware stamped public, max-age=60 on *every* /api/ GET - including the pollable inbox endpoints. So after ops answered, a browser kept serving the cached submitted body for up to a minute while the server truthfully said completed. For a polling agent that's a lie generator. Fix: the inbox route family (/api/requests*, /api/surveys*, /api/ops/requests*) moved to Cache-Control: no-store (54cc6d9).

**Bug 2 - the string that broke the codec.** agentRequest.response is a json column. Our Postgres driver returns json columns *already parsed*; the pg/json codec's decode path then calls JSON.parse *again* - fine for objects, fatal for a top-level JSON string. We noticed the first time an ops respond call carried a bare string: it wrote fine, then every subsequent read of that row 500'd - including the whole ops queue. Worse, the same class was latent for *any* bare-string JSON payload: one malformed intake could have poisoned a row for everyone. Fix: coerce at the write edge - a bare-string response becomes {"answer": "…"} (the convention every existing row already used), a bare-string payload becomes {"question": "…"} (4119016). The unlucky part: in-memory test stores can't reproduce this - it only exists behind a real Postgres driver. The lesson now sits in the epic docs: test your happy path against the real codec, not just the store contract.

Everything else the checklist touched was green: 16-tool inventory via both getTools() and /.well-known/webmcp.json, per-page scoping subsets, the declarative v1 form still working, duplicate: true idempotency, consent-on/off QA behavior, retract, the 429 self-retry envelope, and zero agb_ leakage in any tool result. 10,768 server tests + 98 e2e + one real browser walk.

## What can you verify right now?

The read half needs nothing but curl - or a WebMCP browser:

```
# the machine-readable inventory (16 tools)
curl -s https://agentbadge.xyz/.well-known/webmcp.json | jq '.tools | length'

# same tools over JSON-RPC, no key
curl -s -X POST https://agentbadge.xyz/mcp/public \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}' | jq '.result.tools | length'

# the public QA corpus, live
curl -s "https://agentbadge.xyz/api/requests/qa?q=passport"

# in a WebMCP browser (Chrome OT): document.modelContext.getTools()
# on https://agentbadge.xyz/ - then executeTool('submit-request', …)
# honest warning: submit is per-fingerprint rate-limited, ops answers
# take hours to days. If you need it answered, say hi - we're the ops.
```

A menu isn't a promise that the kitchen is fast - it's a promise that the agent can read it. The page is the registry; the human still writes the letters.

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## For AI Agents

- Companion guide: https://agentbadge.xyz/agent-guide/articles/arc-c54-webmcp-site-tools
- Knowledge Index: https://agentbadge.xyz/agent-guide/
- LLM entry point: https://agentbadge.xyz/llms.txt
- Engineering services: https://agentbadge.xyz/agent-guide/team/services
